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Comment
A Small Departure from the Truth: When
Private Religious Speech Runs Afoul of the
Establishment Clause.
The great trick of regarding small departures from the truth as
the truth itself-on which is founded the entire integral
calculus-is also the basis of our witty speculations, where the
whole thing would often collapse if we considered the departures
with philosophical rigour.
-Georg C. Lichtenberg'
I. INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment to the Constitution prohibits the govern-
ment from making any law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion.2 The Establishment Clause reflects the sound desire of the
Framers to guarantee the religious liberty of all Americans by
prohibiting the government from interfering with an individual's
religious life. The First Amendment also prohibits the government
from abridging the freedom of speech, thus guaranteeing every citi-
zen's right to participate fully in public discourse and to engage in
a free exchange of ideas. Together, the Establishment Clause and
the Free Speech Clause have fostered and promoted free thinking
and self-determination and have become the bedrock of American
liberty.3 However, the government's interest in adhering to the
dictates of the Establishment Clause may conflict with an individ-
ual's right to free speech. The question then arises as to whether
1. Georg C. Lichtenberg, Notebooks, in LICHTENBERG: A DOCTRINE OF SCAT-
TERED OCCASIONS 324 (J.P. Stern trans., 1959).
2. The Establishment and Free Speech Clauses of the Constitution read:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech.
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment applies to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 5 (1947); see also Cruz v.
Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972).
3. See, e.g., GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787: A COMMENTARY
24-25, 36, 162-64 (1989) (arguing that self-government depends on the dual principles of
public debate and toleration established in the First Amendment).
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the Establishment Clause takes precedence over an individual's
right to speak freely.
This Comment focuses primarily on the degree of truth underly-
ing one analogy-that between private religious speech and gov-
ernmental religious speech. Properly defined, an analogy is a form
of reasoning in which one thing is inferred to be the same as an-
other in a certain respect, on the basis of a known similarity be-
tween the things in other respects.4 As an imprecise analytical
method, an analogy stands invariably on some degree of untruth;
that is, an analogy treats distinct and discreet things as if in some
respect they were the same. Nevertheless, the appeal of a good
analogy is almost irresistible; if one is willing to overlook that ini-
tial untruth, the logic is flawless, for it purports to treat like things
in a like manner. This Comment examines whether private reli-
gious speech in a public forum is analogous to governmental reli-
gious speech and whether under the First Amendment a court
properly may impose on private religious expression the same re-
strictions that it imposes on governmental religious expression.
This Comment examines the purpose of the Establishment
Clause and then traces the development of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence with a particular emphasis on its relation to free
speech.' It next analyzes the unprecedented approach taken by the
Seventh Circuit in Doe v. Village of Crestwood6 and Doe v. Small'
in which the court, in a small departure from the truth, treated
private religious expression as if it were governmental religious ex-
pression." This Comment analyzes how the Seventh Circuit ap-
proach jettisons the Free Speech guarantee in the First
Amendment and thereby yields the perverse result of relegating
religious speech to an inferior status in a hierarchy of First
Amendment rights.9
Finally, this Comment proposes an alternative to the extreme
measures employed by the Seventh Circuit. 10 This Comment sug-
gests that when attempting to reconcile a perceived conflict be-
tween the Establishment Clause and an individual's right to free
speech in a public forum, courts should distinguish governmental
4. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 84 (6th ed. 1990).
5. See infra notes 11-44 and accompanying text.
6. 917 F.2d 1476 (7th Cir. 1990), petition for cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3726 (U.S. Apr.
8, 1991) (No. 90-1573).
7. 934 F.2d 743 (7th Cir.), vacated, reh'g granted, 947 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1991).
8. See infra notes 72-116 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 117-55 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
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action from individual speech and fashion a remedy to address
solely the unconstitutional governmental act, and leave the individ-
ual's rights unimpeded.
II. BACKGROUND
Any analysis of a case decided under the First Amendment must
address two immediate issues: 1) whether the decision squares
with the text of the Constitution and the historical sources em-
ployed to interpret that text; and 2) whether the rationale of the
decision comports with the constitutional analysis currently em-
ployed by the Supreme Court. Resolution of these two issues in-
volves an interpretation of the Framers' original intent and a
review of the modem approach taken by courts when addressing
First Amendment cases.
A. Original Intent
Courts and commentators have noted that in the contemporary
debate over the meaning of the Establishment Clause and the ap-
propriate standard of review, both sides in the debate have scoured
primary sources in an effort to assemble an historical record per-
mitting them to claim the legacy of the Framers' original intent. 1
This debate has generally broken down into two opposing factions:
separationists and accomodationists.12
Separationists assert that the Establishment Clause demands a
strict separation between religion and government. 3 Justice
Black's interpretation of the Establishment Clause announced in
Everson v. Board of Education14 has served as the separationists'
manifesto and has dominated the Court's jurisprudence for the
past forty years. 5 The separationists claim a long tradition dating
11. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Doe
v. Small 934 F.2d 743, 754 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Philip B. Kurland, The Origins of the
Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 839, 840 (1986) ("I dare
say that most of the so-called literature in the field of first amendment law-my own
included-reflects the advocate with a cause rather than disinterested scholarship.");
Douglas Laycock, Text, Intent, and the Religion Clauses, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUn. POL'Y 683, 685 (1990) ("Because there is an unusual abundance of historical evi-
dence, and because there is ample evidence to support both sides, both sides appeal to
history.").
12. See DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH-STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 97-106
(1991); John Witte, The Theology and Politics of the First Amendment Religion Clauses.-
A Bicentennial Essay, 40 EMORY L.J. 489, 491 (1991).
13. See DRAKEMAN, supra note 12, at 97.
14. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
15. Writing for the Court in Everson, Justice Black pronounced:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least
1992]
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back to the pilgrims' flight from persecution. 16 Out of this early
persecution, argue the separationists, came a respect and desire for
religious liberty which commands nothing less than complete sepa-
ration of church and state.'7 The separationists find textual sup-
port for their position in Thomas Jefferson's Letter to the Danbury
Baptists.' 8 Jefferson's metaphor of a wall of separation between
church and state captures the activist spirit and the absolutist
stance of the adherents to this view. The separationists find further
support for their interpretation in James Madison's Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, written to counter a
proposal for a general assessment in Virginia in favor of religious
education. 19
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away
from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or insti-
tutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach
or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and
vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion
by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and State."
Id. at 15-16.
16. See DRAKEMAN, supra note 12, at 52.
17. Id.
18. In this letter, Jefferson wrote:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and
his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that
the legislative powers of government reach action only, and not opinions, I con-
template with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which
declared that their legislature should "make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of
separation between Church and State.... I reciprocate your kind prayers for
protection and blessing of the common Father and Creator of man.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, and Stephen S.
Nelson, a committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, in the state of Connecticut
(Jan. 1, 1802), reprinted in JOHN T. NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT
ARE 130-31 (1987). Noonan notes that while President Jefferson extolled the virtue in
the separation of church and state, he closed his letter with a prayer. NOONAN, supra, at
131.
19. Madison wrote:
The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of
every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dic-
tate .... We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no man's right is
abridged by the institution of Civil Society, and that Religion is wholly exempt
from its cognizance.
James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, 1785, re-
printed in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53-54 n.38 (1985).
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In contrast, the accomodationists recognize the weight of the
Framers' grand pronouncements marshalled by the separationists,
but they accuse the separationists of compiling something of a revi-
sionist history.20 The accomodationists argue that a more com-
plete view of history reveals that the Framers' rhetoric on the
separation of church and state did not always comport with their
actual practices.21 Numerous commentators and historians have
catalogued these early breaches in the wall between church and
state.22
In the first Supreme Court decision to break from Justice Black's
interpretation of the Establishment Clause in Everson, now Chief
Justice Rehnquist embraced the accomodationist school of thought
in his dissenting opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree.23 Rehnquist's dis-
sent in Wallace has become one of the authoritative statements of
the accomodationist school. Interpreting the Establishment Clause
in light of the Framers' practices, Justice Rehnquist concluded that
the Establishment Clause only prohibits the establishment of a na-
tional religion and the favoring of one sect over another.24 Rehn-
quist declared that the Court erred in its previous interpretations of
the Establishment Clause based on an incomplete constitutional
history rooted in Jefferson's "misleading metaphor" of a wall of
separation between church and state.25
20. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing that the Court's previous interpretation of the Establishment Clause was based on
an incomplete view of history); DANIEL L. DREISBACH, REAL THREAT AND MERE
SHADOW: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 99-106 (1987) (arguing
that the Framers never intended a complete separation of church and state as evidenced
in the young Republic's favorable policies toward religion); Walter Kindles, Keynote Ad-
dress to the 1991 Annual Meeting of the National Bar Association, reprinted in LIEF
CARTER, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 87 (1991) (argu-
ing that modern jurisprudence misinterprets Locke, Madison, and Jefferson as desiring a
secular state).
21. See DREISBACH, supra note 20, at 102.
22. For example, historians note that Madison and the First Congress appointed a
chaplin and adopted a resolution in favor of a day of prayer and thanksgiving the day
after adopting the Establishment Clause. DRAKEMAN, supra note 12, at 52; DREISBACH,
supra note 20, at 111. In Virginia, Jefferson sponsored a bill to punish sabbath breakers,
and as President, allowed federal support for religious missions to the Indians.
DRAKEMAN, supra note 12, at 52; DREISBACH, supra note 20, at 120-27. For more exten-
sive discussion of such church and state breaches, see ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1982); MICHAEL J.
MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1978).
23. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
24. Id. at 99 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("It is impossible to build sound constitu-
tional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of constitutional history, but unfortu-
1992]
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The debate over the original intent of the Framers of the First
Amendment certainly will continue, and while courts value the
work of historians inquiring into the origins of the Bill of Rights,
such scholarship has limited probative value because "an aware-
ness of history and an appreciation of the aims of the Founding
Fathers do not always resolve concrete problems. ' 26 However, the
philosophical thrust of the Bill of Rights demonstrates the general
proposition that the Framers intended to protect individual lib-
erty.27 With the Establishment Clause, the Framers intended to
define the limits of the new government and to reserve for the indi-
vidual the freedom to choose his own values in accordance with his
28own conscience.
B. The Modern Approach
The Supreme Court did not interpret the Establishment Clause
until 1947, in Everson v. Board of Education,29 over one hundred
and fifty years after the First Congress adopted the First Amend-
ment. In the forty years following Everson, the Court has ex-
panded the scope of the Establishment Clause to prohibit an ever-
increasing range of governmental activity.30 The Court's modern
approach to Establishment Clause issues consists of a three-prong
test promulgated by the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman.3" Under the
Lemon test, the Court will uphold a challenged statute or other
governmental action if: (1) it has a secular purpose; (2) its primary
nately the Establishment Clause has been expressly freighted with Jefferson's misleading
metaphor for nearly 40 years.").
26. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 233-34 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
27. See PAUL G. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 13 (1964) (arguing
that the protection and promotion of religious liberty is the central concern of the First
Amendment); FRANCIS GRAHAM LEE, WALL OF CONTROVERSY: CHURCH-STATE
CONFLICT IN AMERICA 117 (1986) (arguing that the purpose of the Bill of Rights and the
First Amendment was "to pinpoint those areas over which the federal government was
powerless to legislate"). As one scholar has observed:
[T]he intended direction of the first amendment was the enhancement of indi-
vidual freedom .... [T]he objectives were to establish an equality among per-
sons, so that each individual could choose without interference how to
commune with his god, and to avoid the havoc that religious conflicts had im-
posed on mankind throughout history.
Kurland, supra note 11, at 860.
28. See generally Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CAL. L. REV.
305 (1990) (discussing value-neutral liberalism and tolerance in relation to the First
Amendment).
29. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
30. See infra notes 32-33.
31. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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effect neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it does not in-
volve an excessive entanglement with religion.32
In applying the Lemon test, the Court has engaged in a fact-
intensive analysis in which constitutionality turns upon elusive dis-
tinctions. Under the Lemon test, the Court has made various and
seemingly inconsistent judicial determinations; and despite the
number of decisions in this area, no clear standard has evolved.33
32. Id. at 612-13. Since 1972, the Court has applied the Lemon test to a variety of
issues arising under the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S.
589, 602 (1988) (holding that a statute granting aid to religious and non-religious organi-
zations providing counseling on teenage sexuality does not violate the Establishment
Clause); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987) (finding that a Louisiana statute
prohibiting the teaching of the theory of evolution in public schools unless creationism is
also taught has no secular purpose and has the primary effect of advancing religion and is
thus unconstitutional); Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,
485 (1986) (determining that the First Amendment does not preclude state assistance to a
blind student studying to become a minister); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 410 (1985)
(finding that a New York City program providing on-premises instruction to parochial
school students risks excessive entanglement between church and state and thus is uncon-
stitutional); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 382 (1985) (holding that
the Establishment Clause prevents a public school district from providing classes to pri-
vate school students); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 708 (1985) (hold-
ing that a Connecticut statute which provides workers with an absolute right not to work
on their Sabbath violates the Establishment Clause); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 55-
56 (1985) (finding that an Alabama statute authorizing a moment of silence in public
schools has no secular purpose and consequently is unconstitutional); Larkin v. Grendel's
Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 123 (1982) (holding that a Massachusetts statute giving churches
a discretionary veto over the granting of liquor licenses to establishments within 500 feet
of a church violates the Establishment Clause); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40 (1980)
(finding that a Kentucky statute requiring the display of the Ten Commandments in
public classrooms has no secular purpose and is therefore unconstitutional); Committee
for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653 (1980) (holding that a
New York statute providing public funds to private schools for performing services man-
dated by the state has a secular purpose and thus is constitutional); Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229, 235-36 (1977) (holding that state aid to private schools in the form of
diagnostic and therapeutic services is constitutionally permissible, but that the Establish-
ment Clause prohibits a state from loaning instructional materials and equipment to non-
public school students); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 373 (1975) (Brennan, J., con-
curring) (determining that a state may loan textbooks to students in private schools with-
out violating the Establishment Clause); Committee for Public Educ. and Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772 (1973) (finding that a New York plan to give sec-
tarian schools reimbursement grants violates the Establishment Clause); Hunt v. McNair,
413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973) (holding that a South Carolina statute creating an agency to
assist institutions of higher education in financing construction projects does not violate
the Establishment Clause); Levitt v. Committee for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty,
413 U.S. 472, 480 (1973) (finding that a New York statute reimbursing private schools for
administrative costs constitutes an impermissible aid to religion).
33. Compare Everson, 330 U.S. at 16-17 (decided prior to Lemon, holding that the
state could provide private school students with bus transportation to and from school)
and Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (decided prior to Lemon, holding that
the state could provide textbooks to private school students) with Wolman v. Walter, 433
U.S. 229, 249, 254 (1977) (decided after Lemon, holding that the state could not provide
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Thus, because of the risk of inconsistent judgments under the
Lemon test, many commentators have criticized the test and have
urged the Court to abandon it. 4
In more recent cases, the Court increasingly has focused on
whether the government has endorsed a religion or a religious
practice.3 5 Proposed by Justice O'Connor in Lynch v. Donnelly,36
the endorsement test is essentially a refinement of the second prong
of the Lemon test. Under the second prong of the Lemon test, the
Court asks, "was the primary effect of the challenged practice to
advance religion?"3 7 Applying the endorsement test, the Court
asks, "would a reasonable person view the challenged governmen-
tal practice as endorsing religion?"38 Courts applying the endorse-
ment test, however, engage in the same specific content and context
analysis that plagued courts applying the Lemon test. 9
private school students with transportation on school field trips, or with maps and
magazines).
34. See DRAKEMAN, supra note 12, at 106 ("[T]he most compelling criticism of the
three-part test is the fact that it has failed to generate any clear or consistent First
Amendment jurisprudence."); Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence:
The Equal Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1986)
("These decisions are wholly unprincipled and indefensible."); Arnold H. Loewy, Re-
thinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under the Establishment Clause: The
Untapped Potential of Justice O'Connor's Insight, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1070 (1986)
(concluding that the Court's approach to Establishment Clause cases is muddled and
inconsistent); Michael W. McConnell, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment:
Where Is the Supreme Court Heading? (criticizing the Court's current analysis for being
confused and incoherent), reprinted in CHRISTIAN L. CASTLE & JAMES L. SWANSON,
THE FIRST AMENDMENT LAW HANDBOOK 269 (1990); William P. Marshall, Un-
precedential Analysis and Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 925, 928 (1986)
(arguing that Establishment Clause jurisprudence is inconsistent and at times
incomprehensible).
35. See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2370-71 (1990) (holding that
allowing student religious organizations in secondary schools equal access to school facil-
ities is not an endorsement of religion); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592
(1989) (finding that a government display of religious symbols is unconstitutional if it has
the effect of endorsing religion); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 17 (1989)
(finding that government support of the distribution of religious messages by religious
organizations violates the Establishment Clause); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,
585 (1987) (striking down a Louisiana statute requiring that creationism be given equal
treatment with evolution in public schools); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373, 389-92 (1985) (invalidating two programs allowing use of state-paid staff to
provide instruction to non-public school students on religious school premises because of
significant risk of state sponsored indoctrination of religious beliefs); Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985) (invalidating an Alabama moment of silence statute).
36. 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
37. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
38. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688. Professor Tribe has formulated a similar test and pro-
poses that the challenged practice be judged from the perspective of a "reasonable non-
adherent." LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1296 (2d ed. 1988).
39. See James M. Lewis & Michael L. Vild, Note, A Controversial Twist of Lemon:
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The imprecision and inconsistency of the current constitutional
tests are perhaps best demonstrated by an examination of the cases
dealing with the issue of religious displays on public property dur-
ing a holiday. In Lynch v. Donnelly,4° a city's display of a creche at
Christmastime in a park was constitutionally permissible because
the display also included secular symbols negating any inference of
endorsement.41 However, in County of Allegheny v. ACL U,42 the
Court held that a creche displayed in a courthouse violated the
Establishment Clause, even though a private organization had
donated the display.4 a Yet, in the same opinion, the Allegheny
Court held that a menorah displayed outside of the courthouse did
not violate the Establishment Clause because the menorah stood
near a Christmas tree." Thus, the holdings in Lynch and Alle-
gheny demonstrate the discrepancies that the current analysis
yields; and until the Court fashions a coherent approach, lower
courts will continue to struggle with these discrepancies.
III. DISCUSSION
Charles Evans Hughes once quipped that the Constitution is
what judges say it is.45 In two recent First Amendment cases, Doe
v. Village of Crestwood" and Doe v. Small,47 it seems as if the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals has taken that aphorism to heart in
fashioning a novel analysis which equates an individual's private
religious expression in a public forum with governmental religious
expression, and subsequently restricts the individual's expression
with the pretext of complying with the Establishment Clause.4" In
both cases, the Seventh Circuit disregarded the reasoning of prior
The Endorsement Test as the New Establishment Clause Standard, 65 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 671, 688-96 (1990) (discussing the problems of hypothetical objectivity and the
reasonable observer standard and arguing that in judging religious activity, there is no
universal standard of reasonableness).
40. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
41. Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The secular symbols in the Lynch display
included, among other things, reindeer and a sleigh, a Santa Claus, a Christmas tree, an
assortment of candy canes, a group of carolers, and a sign declaring "Seasons Greetings."
Id. at 671.
42. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
43. Id. at 600-02.
44. Id. at 616-18.
45. Charles Evans Hughes, Speech in Elmira, New York (May 3, 1907), in BRUCE
BOHLE, THE HOME BOOK OF AMERICAN QUOTATIONS 95 (1986).
46. 917 F.2d 1476 (7th Cir. 1990), petition for cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3726 (U.S.
Apr. 8, 1991) (No. 90-1573).
47. 934 F.2d 743 (7th Cir.), vacated, reh'g granted, 947 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1991).
48. See infra notes 72-116 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court cases and has embarked on an uncharted and ill-
fated course that threatens to consume fundamental First Amend-
ment freedoms.49
A. The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has declined to create a hierarchy of consti-
tutional rights.50 On two occasions, the Court has had the oppor-
tunity to review cases involving a potential conflict between the
Establishment Clause and the Free Speech Clause: Widmar v. Vin-
cent 5I and Board of Education v. Mergens.s2 In each case, however,
the Court expressly declined to decide the issue. 3
In Widmar v. Vincent,54 the Court considered the constitutional-
ity of a state university's policy of denying religious groups access
to university facilities. Writing for the majority, Justice Powell re-
jected the university's contention that the Establishment Clause
mandated its policy of exclusion." Instead, Justice Powell ana-
lyzed the issue as one of free speech in a public forum and found
the university's policy of exclusion to be an impermissible content-
based discrimination against religious speech.5 6 The Court held
that a university policy allowing religious groups equal access to a
public forum would not confer an imprimatur of state endorsement
on the religious group.57
By deciding the case solely on free speech grounds, the Court
expressly avoided deciding the conflict between the competing
49. See infra notes 117-55 and accompanying text.
50. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (declining to favor one con-
stitutional right over another in weighing freedom of expression against the right to a fair
trial).
51. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
52. 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
53. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 273 n. 13; Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2373. The Court did decide
a series of cases upholding the right of Jehovah's Witnesses to hold services in public
parks: Poulous v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345
U.S. 67 (1953); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951). However, these cases did
not present outright Establishment Clause issues, and the Court decided them as public
forum cases. See Laycock, supra note 34, at 12.
54. 454 U.S. 263, 265-66 (1981).
55. Id. at 276.
56. Id. at 277 (observing that the university's "exclusionary policy violates the funda-
mental principle that a state regulation of speech should be content-neutral, and the Uni-
versity is unable to justify this violation under applicable constitutional standards").
To exclude speech based solely on its content from a public forum, the State must
demonstrate that the restriction is "necessary to serve a compelling state interest" and
that the restriction is "narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
57. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 273.
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First Amendment interests.58 However, the Court did suggest that
the asserted state interest in abiding by the Establishment Clause
would not be sufficiently compelling to justify a content-based ex-
clusion against religious speech. 59
In the 1990 Term, the Court confronted another possible conflict
between the Free Speech Clause and the Establishment Clause.
Board of Education v. Mergens6° involved a challenge to a high
school's policy denying a student group equal access to the school's
facilities for religious purposes, claiming that such denial was in
violation of the Equal Access Act.6' The Court reiterated its hold-
ing in Widmar, stating that allowing a religious group equal access
to a public forum does not violate the Establishment Clause.62 A
policy of neutrality towards religion, the Court reasoned, demands
that religious groups have the same rights in a public forum that
non-religious groups have.63 Furthermore, when a religious group
operates in a public forum, a reasonable observer would not per-
ceive the government as endorsing that activity merely because it
occurred in a public forum.61
The Court noted that while the Establishment Clause prohibits
governmental speech endorsing religion, such a situation is wholly
distinct from private speech promoting religion in a public forum,
the latter falling under the purview of the Free Speech Clause.65
Consequently, the Court held that allowing religious groups equal
access to open fora does not violate the Establishment Clause and,
therefore, the Court was not compelled to decide the free speech
58. Id. at 273 n.13 ("[We need not] reach the questions that would arise if state ac-
commodation of free exercise and free speech rights should, in a particular case, conflict
with the prohibitions of the Establishment Clause.").
59. Id. at 276.
60. 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
61. Id. at 2371. Under the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (1988), enacted
in 1984, Congress extended the Widmar rationale to public secondary schools by provid-
ing that:
It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives Federal
financial assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny equal access or
a fair opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct
a meeting within that limited open forum on the basis of the religious, political,
philosophical, or other content of the speech at such meetings.
20 U.S.C. § 4071(a).
62. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2370-71.
63. Id. at 2371.
64. Id. at 2372.
"65. Id. ("[T]here is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing reli-
gion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion,
which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.").
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66issue.
The Supreme Court has yet to decide a case addressing a conflict
between the Free Speech Clause and the Establishment Clause.
The Court has nevertheless held that free expression in a public
forum is one of the highest of constitutional values.67 The value
the Court places on freedom of expression is reflected in the re-
quirement that the state make a showing of a compelling govern-
mental interest before it can restrict such speech.68 In view of the
deference accorded the individual liberties enshrined in the First
Amendment, the lower courts that have addressed the tension be-
tween the Free Speech Clause and the Establishment Clause have
reached startling conclusions.69
B. The Seventh Circuit
Due to the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court, lower
courts addressing the conflict between the Free Speech and Estab-
lishment Clauses have had to struggle in their attempt to arrive at
an appropriate resolution of the issue. In two recent cases, Doe v.
Village of Crestwood and Doe v. Small,7' the Seventh Circuit had
the unenviable task of attempting to reconcile the competing inter-
ests of the Free Speech Clause and the Establishment Clause.
In Doe v. Village of Crestwood, the Seventh Circuit upheld a dis-
trict court's order enjoining a Roman Catholic priest from cele-
brating mass at an Italian festival in a public park.72 The Village of
Crestwood sponsored a festival, "A Touch of Italy," which pro-
vided a broad range of activities designed to celebrate Italian cul-
ture, including a mass said in Italian.73 The plaintiff, Doe, sued the
Village, alleging that the mass violated the Establishment Clause.74
Writing for the court, Judge Easterbrook 75 applied Justice
O'Connor's endorsement test and found that the mass was undeni-
66. Id. at 2373 ("[W]e do not decide respondents' claims under the Free Speech and
Free Exercise Clauses.").
67. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980) (observing that public picketing "has
always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values").
68. Id. at 476.
69. See, e.g., infra notes 72-116 and accompanying text.
70. 917 F.2d 1476 (7th Cir. 1990), petition for cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3726 (U.S.
Apr. 8, 1991) (No. 90-1573).
71. 934 F.2d 743 (7th Cir.), vacated, reh'g granted, 947 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1991).
72. Crestwood, 917 F.2d at 1479.
73. Id. at 1477.
74. Id.
75. Judge Flaum joined Judge Easterbrook's opinion for the court. Id. at 1480.
Judge Coffey dissented. Id.
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ably religious despite the secular activities surrounding it.76 Ac-
cordingly, Judge Easterbrook conceded that the entire case turned
on whether the mass was sponsored by the Village or whether it
was sponsored by the Crestwood Woman's Club, a private organi-
zation.7" Reviewing the record, the court held that the district
court's conclusion that the Village was at least one of the sponsors
of the mass was not clearly erroneous. 8 The majority based its
holding on the fact that a Village employee had invited the priest
to the festival and that a Village publication included an advertise-
ment promoting the festival and inviting the public to the mass. 9
The court viewed this as evidence sufficient to conclude that the
Village improperly endorsed religion and consequently violated the
Establishment Clause. 0
In dissent, Judge Coffey argued that a reasonable person viewing
a mass at an Italian festival would not perceive the Village as en-
dorsing the mass because Roman Catholicism is such a significant
part of Italian culture."' Judge Coffey expressed concern over the
fact that the plaintiff used the Establishment Clause not for the
protection of religious liberty, as the Framers intended, but rather
as a tool to suppress the religious expression of others.8 2 Finally,
Judge Coffey could not see how the mass in the park impaired the
plaintiff's religious liberty, and therefore, he could not find a con-
stitutional violation.83
In Doe v. Small,84 the Seventh Circuit decided another case in-
volving a conflict between the Establishment Clause and a private
76. Id. at 1479. The festival celebrating Italian culture consisted primarily of Italian
sports, Italian music, and Italian food. Id. at 1478.
77. Id. at 1479.
78. Id. ("On this slim record, however, the district judge's conclusions cannot be
found clearly erroneous.").
79. Id. The court found objectionable a small inset in the Village sponsored adver-
tisement. Id. The inset read: "Join Us for a Traditional Italian Mass Celebration at 4
p.m. Sat., August 1lth. No admittance charge for Mass." Id. at 1480.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1483-87 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 1494 (Coffey, J., dissenting). In particular, Judge Coffey noted:
The plaintiff is concerned only with attempting to suppress the religious prac-
tices of others, not the government's suppression of his own religious liberty.
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment was never intended to be
used as a sword to suppress and stifle the religious practices or beliefs of Ameri-
can citizens.
Id. (Coffey, J., dissenting).
83. Id. (Coffey, J., dissenting) ("It is impossible to impair one's religious belief with-
out somehow preventing him from expressing it .... Let us not contrive ways to make it
difficult for people to practice the religion of their choice.").
84. 934 F.2d 743 (7th Cir.), vacated, reh'g granted, 947 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1991).
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organization's right to free speech and free exercise. Doe, the
plaintiff in Small, resided in the City of Ottawa, Illinois, and sued
the City and its mayor, George Small, to enjoin a display consist-
ing of sixteen paintings depicting the life of Jesus Christ from ap-
pearing in a public park. 5 The paintings had appeared annually in
the park since 1956 as part of a Christmas display, and initially
were maintained by the City.8 6 In the 1970s, the City declined to
put up the paintings.8 7
In 1980, a private organization, the Ottawa Jaycees, acquired the
paintings and, once again, displayed them in the park at Christ-
mastime. 8 In 1986, under Mayor Small's leadership, the Ottawa
City Council passed a resolution endorsing the activities of the Ot-
tawa Jaycees in maintaining the display.8 9 The district court
granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and prohib-
ited the display of the paintings in the park.90 The Ottawa Jaycees
appealed, denying that the display violated the Establishment
Clause and asserting a violation of their own rights of free speech
and free exercise. 9'
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit first considered the Establish-
ment Clause issue. The court reviewed the history and purpose of
the Establishment Clause,92 and then subjected the issue of the
paintings in the park to the rigor of two constitutional tests: the
Lemon test and Justice O'Connor's endorsement test.93 The court
found that the display failed the secular purpose94 and primary ef-
85. Id. at 747-52.
86. Id. at 747. The paintings were originally commissioned by a merchant's associa-
tion in Ottawa in an effort to promote the holiday of Christmas. Id. With each painting
measuring eight feet high, the display spanned most of the west side of the park. Id.
87. Id. at 748. The City did not show the paintings due to public criticism of the
display. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 749. The City Counsel resolved to "endorse the activities of the Ottawa
Jaycees in maintaining, erecting, dismantling and storing" the pictures. Id. The City
also granted the Jaycees permission to place permanent foundations in the park for the
paintings. Id. at 750.
90. Id. at 746.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 752-57. For an examination of the origins of the Establishment Clause, see
supra notes 11-28 and accompanying text.
93. Small, 934 F.2d at 757-58. For a general discussion of the Lemon test and Justice
O'Connor's endorsement test, see supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
94. Small, 934 F.2d at 763. On the first prong of the Lemon test, the court found that
the City's resolution in support of the display lacked a secular purpose. Id. at 760. The
court rejected the Jaycees' argument that the display was a permissible accommodation
of religion as part of a Christmas celebration. Id. at 762. Distinguishing the Ottawa
display from the displays in Lynch and Allegheny where the Supreme Court found a city's
display of a religious symbol permissible, see supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text,
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fects95 prongs of Lemon. The court also found that the City's past
involvement with the display constituted impermissible
endorsement. 96
In its free speech analysis, the Seventh Circuit took an unprece-
dented approach and found that the state had a compelling interest
in preserving the Establishment Clause and consequently that the
state may restrict an individual's religious expression.9" The court
rejected the Jaycees' claim that the First Amendment protected
private religious expression in a public forum.98 The court then
distinguished the Small case from the Supreme Court's decisions in
Widmar and Mergens on a factual basis.99 The court reasoned that
since the state could enforce a content-based exclusion of speech in
the presence of a compelling state interest, and that since the state
had a compelling interest in not violating the Establishment
Clause, the state could abridge the Jaycees' right to free speech. 1o
In a spirited dissent, Judge Coffey warned that the majority
opinion set a dangerous precedent with the ease in which it sup-
pressed fundamental First Amendment freedoms, namely, free
the Small court found that the religious message conveyed by the display was not suffi-
ciently neutralized by the presence of other secular symbols. Small, 934 F.2d at 762.
95. Small, 934 F.2d at 766. On the second prong of the Lemon test, the court contin-
ued its inquiry into the content and the context of the display. Id. at 764-66. Finding the
content of the paintings undeniably religious, the court distinguished the paintings from
the display of the creche in Lynch because in Small, the pictures depicted the life of
Christ, not just his birth. Id. at 764.
96. Id. at 764. Finally, in coming to the endorsement test, the court looked to the
City's past involvement with the display. The court concluded that because of the dura-
tion and regularity of the display, the display would necessarily convey a message of
endorsement to a reasonable observer. Id. at 768.
97. Id. at 770 ("[T]he state may enforce a content-based exclusion of free speech in
the presence of 'a compelling state interest that is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end.' "). For opinions discussing free speech in a public forum, see cases cited supra note
53 and infra note 133 and accompanying text.
98. Small, 934 F.2d at 770-71. The court stated:
Where private speakers desire access to a public forum, the relevant constitu-
tional inquiry remains the same. Neither the Park's status as a public forum
nor the display's sponsorship by the Jaycees, a private organization, resolves the
conflict between the Establishment Clause and free speech clause in favor of the
defendant.
Id. at 770.
99. Id. at 772. The Seventh Circuit distinguished Small from Widmar based on the
fact that in Widmar, the religious group was not the sole group appearing in the public
forum so that there was no danger that the religious group would dominate the forum.
Id. In contrast, in Small, the court observed that only the Jaycees' display appeared in
the park such that the danger of the appearance of endorsement was increased. Id. The
court distinguished Mergens on the basis that it was decided on statutory grounds. Id.
100. Id. at 770 ("Quite simply, government has a compelling interest in complying
with the constitutional requirement not to violate the Establishment Clause.").
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speech and free exercise. 1 ' Judge Coffey first determined that the
Jaycees' display of the paintings constituted private religious
speech. 10 2 The City, he noted, expended no funds and offered no
other support for the display, and the relationship between the City
and the Jaycees was no different than the relationship between the
City and any other private organization that sought to use the
park.10 3 Judge Coffey took issue with the majority's assertion that
the City had sought to promote the Jaycees' display, and that
therefore the City's endorsement transformed the Jaycees' expres-
sion into governmental speech. 1" Since the City provided equal
access to the park, Judge Coffey noted that the majority's conclu-
sion rested on the false assumption that the government seeks to
promote all that it refuses to censor. 105
In addition, Judge Coffey harshly criticized the majority's appli-
cation of the Lemon test to private speech. 11 He noted that be-
cause all religious speech promotes or endorses religion, the
majority opinion, taken to its logical conclusion, would effectively
exclude all religious expression from public forums.10 7 Further-
more, Judge Coffey found that the majority erred in its attempt to
distinguish Small from Widmar and Mergens since in both of those
cases the Supreme Court held that the government could not close
a public forum to a private party's religious practices. 0 8
Relying on Widmar and Mergens, Judge Coffey proceeded to ap-
ply the Lemon test to the specific governmental act at issue,
namely, the City's policy granting the Jaycees access to the park.'°9
Judge Coffey rejected the majority's assertion that permitting reli-
101. Id. at 792 (Coffey, J., dissenting) ("[The majority] has embarked on a journey
whose end would exclude any and all religious types of expression from public forums.").
102. Id. at 796 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 793-94 (Coffey, J., dissenting). Judge Coffey also noted that the paintings
were accompanied by a sign in the park that read: "THIS DISPLAY HAS BEEN ER-
ECTED AND MAINTAINED SOLELY BY THE OTTAWA JAYCEES, A PRIVATE
ORGANIZATION, WITHOUT THE USE OF PUBLIC FUNDS." Id. at 795 (Coffey,
J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 797 (Coffey, J., dissenting) ("When the extent of the City's involvement
with the display is compiled, it is obvious that the City's actions fail to convert the
Jaycees' private speech into governmental speech.").
105. Id. at 805, 816 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 802-03 (Coffey, J., dissenting). Judge Coffey reasoned that the Establish-
ment Clause applied exclusively to government action and, consequently, that the major-
ity erred in its reliance on the Lemon test. Id. (Coffey, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 801 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 805-07 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 812 (Coffey, J., dissenting). Not only did Judge Coffey find the City's
policy of equal access permissible under the Establishment Clause, but he found that
Widmar and Mergens mandated such a policy. Id. (Coffey, J., dissenting).
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gious expression in a public forum advances or endorses religion. 0
He noted that a reasonable observer would not regard a govern-
mental policy of equal access allowing religious speech in a public
forum as an endorsement of religion."' Moreover, Judge Coffey
argued that even if the City itself had sponsored the Jaycees' dis-
play, the surrounding holiday display was sufficient to neutralize
any possibility of endorsement."
2
Finally, Judge Coffey applied the third prong of the Lemon test,
which prohibits excessive governmental entanglement with reli-
gion' 13 and found no threat of entanglement from the Jaycees' dis-
play, or the city's policy of equal access." 4 Rather, he found
excessive entanglement in the new course the majority opinion had
charted, which requires the courts to decide what is permissible
religious expression and what is not." 5 In conclusion, Judge Cof-
fey accused the majority of being hostile to religion, reasoning that
if the First Amendment protects hate speech and morally offensive
speech, surely the First Amendment must also protect religious
speech." 16
IV. ANALYSIS
Justice Brennan once warned that the Establishment Clause
should not be used as a sword to justify the repression of reli-
gion." '7 Once vaunted as the treasured shield of individual reli-
gious liberty and the guard against governmental intrusion, it
seems that the day indeed has come when the Establishment
Clause has become a pretext for governmental censorship of reli-
gious speech.
The analysis employed by the Seventh Circuit in addressing the
conflict between the Free Speech and the Establishment Clauses
seriously limits religious expression." 8 Certainly, traditional Es-
110. Id. at 816 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
111. Id. (Coffey, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 817 (Coffey, J., dissenting). The paintings were part of a larger holiday
display that included a fifteen foot snowman, holiday lights, candles, and bows. Id. at
767.
113. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
114. Small, 934 F.2d at 819-20 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 819 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 821 (Coffey, J., dissenting) ("If this decision stands, private religious
speech will be banned from public forums. Rather than demonstrating neutrality toward
religion, a policy of banning private religious speech from a public forum clearly demon-
strates hostility.").
117. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 642 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) (striking
down a Tennessee statute that disqualified ministers from serving as legislators).
118. See supra notes 72-116 and accompanying text.
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tablishment Clause analysis prohibited the government from lend-
ing support to a religious organization's religious message." 9
However, it is the government's support of the message, not the
religious message itself, that violates the Establishment Clause.
The analysis employed by the Seventh Circuit in Crestwood and
Small extends beyond merely prohibiting state support of religious
expression, and, as these cases illustrate, actually prohibits the ex-
pression itself. 20
At issue in all the Establishment Clause cases is the question of
governmental endorsement.' 2' For example, in Allegheny, the
Supreme Court found that the location of a creche on a courthouse
stairway represented an impermissible governmental support of
religious expression.' 22 The Court, however, held only the govern-
mental endorsement impermissible-the endorsement being simply
the location of the display on the stairway. 23 The remedy in Alle-
gheny, as in any case where an Establishment Clause violation oc-
curs, was to order the state to stop endorsing the display, namely,
to remove the display from the staircase. 124
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit in both Crestwood and Small
went well beyond curtailing what it perceived to be governmental
endorsement of religious expression. 25 In Small, the court found
that a city council resolution constituted endorsement, and yet, in
its disposition of the case, the court went beyond attacking the
state's act of endorsement and proceeded to affirm the district
court's order completely banning the display from the park. 126
Similarly, in Crestwood, the governmental endorsement consisted
of a newspaper advertisement, and yet, instead of ordering the state
to stop advertising, the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's
order prohibiting the priest from saying mass in the Village
119. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
120. See supra notes 72-116 and accompanying text.
121. See cases cited supra notes 32, 35.
122. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 599-600 (1989) ("IT]he creche sits
on the Grand Staircase, the 'main' and 'most beautiful part' of the building that is the
seat of county government. No viewer could reasonably think that it occupies this loca-
tion without the support and approval of the government.") (citation omitted).
123. Id. at 600 n.50 ("[A]ny display located there fairly may be understood to express
views that receive the support and endorsement of the government .... The county
created a visual link between itself and the creche.").
124. Id. at 602 ("The display of the creche in this context, therefore, must be perma-
nently enjoined.").
125. See supra notes 72-116 and accompanying text.
126. Doe v. Small, 934 F.2d 743, 746 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Because the City wished to
promote the religious message of the paintings by permitting their annual display in
Washington Park, we affirm the judgment below.").
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park. 127
If the Seventh Circuit had followed Supreme Court Establish-
ment Clause precedent, 28 it would have narrowed its holding to
proscribing the acts of governmental endorsement. Critical in the
Court's jurisprudence has been the understanding that the Estab-
lishment Clause applies only to the government.' 29  Likewise,
where the Court has found endorsement, it has ordered the state to
cease only its endorsement. 30 The Court has never ordered indi-
viduals or private organizations to abandon their rights of free
speech or free exercise under the guise of complying with the Es-
tablishment Clause. In striking disparity, however, stand the Sev-
enth Circuit's decisions in Crestwood and Small. If the Seventh
Circuit had followed Supreme Court precedent, in Crestwood, the
court would have ordered the Village to cease advertising the mass;
and in Small, the court would have declared the City's resolution
to support the display unconstitutional.
One of the problems with the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Crest-
wood and Small was the court's failure to adequately recognize the
significance of the public forum. In those cases in which courts
have prohibited the display of religious symbols, the location of the
display constituted an endorsement.' 3 ' However, in Small and
Crestwood, the issue of endorsement turned on facts wholly unre-
lated to the location of the display. It is well established that a
127. Doe v. Village of Crestwood, 917 F.2d 1476, 1479 (7th Cir. 1990).
128. In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court has held that the Establishment
Clause forbids state endorsement or promotion of religion. See Board of Educ. v.
Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2370-71 (1990); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573
(1989); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 17 (1989); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482
U.S. 578, 593 (1987); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389-92 (1985);
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962).
129. See, e.g., Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 600 ("But the Establishment Clause does not
limit only the religious content of the government's own communications. It also prohib-
its the government's support and promotion of religious communications by religious
organizations.").
130. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (finding that government
support of the distribution of religious messages by religious organizations violates the
Establishment Clause); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 597 (1987) (striking down a
Louisiana statute requiring that creationism be given equal treatment with evolution in
public schools); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397-98 (1985) (inval-
idating two programs allowing use of state paid staff to provide instruction to non-public
students on religious school premises because of significant risk of state sponsored indoc-
trination of religious beliefs); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (invalidating an Ala-
bama moment of silence statute).
131. See, e.g., Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 600 n.50. ("The Grand Staircase does not ap-
pear to be the kind of location in which all were free to place their displays for weeks at a
time, so that the presence of the creche in that location for over six weeks would then not
serve to associate the government with the creche.").
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park is a quintessential public forum.1 32 A religious display in a
public park to which all citizens have equal access, because it is a
public forum, does not carry the imprimatur of governmental ap-
proval that might result if the display occurred in a closed forum
over which the government exercised control. 33 Instead, it is the
Village's advertisement in Crestwood and the City's resolution in
Small that would have qualified as impermissible endorsements of
religion and thus would violate the Establishment Clause regard-
less of where the display or activity took place. If the mass in
Crestwood took place in a local church, the Village's advertisement
inviting the public to the mass would be no less of an endorsement
because the mass was going to be held in a church rather than in a
public park. Yet, in such a case, the court would be loath to issue
an injunction prohibiting the mass. Rather, it would proscribe the
government's act of endorsement and leave the private religious
activity undisturbed.' 34
Specifically, the Supreme Court has held that private religious
speech has the same rights in the public forum as non-religious
speech, 35 and yet the Seventh Circuit has carved out a dangerous
exception to this rule. In Small and Crestwood, the Seventh Cir-
cuit has created a double standard which affords religious speech a
lesser degree of protection than non-religious speech. The appar-
ent rationale behind these decisions is that religious speech in a
public park is more susceptible to governmental regulation and
132. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 178-79 (1983); Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983); Amalgamated Food Employers
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 315 (1968) ("[S]treets, sidewalks,
parks, and other similar public places are so historically associated with the exercise of
First Amendment rights that access to them for the purpose of exercising such rights
cannot constitutionally be denied broadly and absolutely"). In Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S.
496, 515 (1939), the Court wrote:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been
held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions. Such use . . . has, from ancient times, been a part of the
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.
Id.
133. See, e.g., ACLU v. Village of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding
that a cross erected on the roof of a municipal firehouse violated the Establishment
Clause).
134. See, e.g., Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding
that the city could not pay the cost of building an altar for a Papal mass but that the mass
could be held in the park), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d
931 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (allowing the Pope to say mass in a public park).
135. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2370-71 (1990); Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263, 273 (1981).
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outright prohibition. Yet neither the law nor logic supports such a
position. To the contrary, the Court has held that where there is
equal access to a public forum, the law makes no distinction be-
tween religious and non-religious speech in that public forum.' 36
However, in Small and Crestwood, but for the fact that the individ-
ual or private organization expressed a religious view, the state
would not have restricted the speech of the individual or the organ-
ization. If in Crestwood and Small the religious speech had been
governmental speech, then the speech should have been sup-
pressed. In these cases, however, the government endorsed the
religious speech of a private party-the government did not act on
its own initiative and communicate its own religious speech.1 37
The extreme measures taken and the incongruous results
reached by the Seventh Circuit in Crestwood and Small are perhaps
attributable in part to the constitutional test the court employed.
In both Crestwood and Small, the Seventh Circuit purported to ap-
ply Justice O'Connor's much-heralded endorsement test. 138 When
it first appeared on the scene, commentators had high hopes that
the endorsement test would save the Lemon test from a much-de-
served ruin'3 9 and transform Establishment Clause jurisprudence
into a coherent and intelligible body of law.' 4° Yet, as Crestwood
and Small demonstrate, the endorsement test brings with it the
same sort of fact-intensive analysis that plagued the Lemon test.' 4
Courts engaging in the endorsement analysis have succumbed to
the same picayune inquiry that characterized the approach under
Lemon by which courts seemingly abandoned the ancient maxim:
136. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2372; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 273; see also William P. Mar-
shall, Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REV. 545, 560
(1983) ("After Widmar, religious speech is speech-no more, no less.").
137. See supra notes 72-116 and accompanying text.
138. Small, 934 F.2d at 757; Crestwood, 917 F.2d at 1478.
139. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the shortcom-
ings of the Lemon test.
140. For favorable comments on the endorsement test, see Donald L. Beschle, The
Conservative as Liberal: The Religion Clauses, Liberal Neutrality, and the Approach of
Justice O'Connor, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 151 (1987); Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking
Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under the Establishment Clause: The Untapped
Potential of Justice O'Connor's Insight, 64 N.C. L. REv. 1049, 1051 (1986); William P.
Marshall, We Know It When We See It: The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S.
CAL. L. REV. 495 (1986); Developments in the Law-Religion and State, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 1606, 1647 (1987); W. Scott Simpson, Comment, Lemon Reconstituted: Justice
O'Connor's Proposed Modifications of the Lemon Test for Establishment Clause Viola-
tions, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 465 (1986).
141. See sources cited supra note 34 for critical commentary on the Lemon test.
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lex non curat de minimis.142 Few things are more disconcerting
than observing a court engage in such tortured analysis in which
the question of constitutionality turns upon apparently trivial dis-
tinctions in location and proximity. 43 Even more puzzling is the
approach that validates the opening of a session of a state legisla-
ture with a prayer lead by a chaplin hired by the legislature"4 but
invalidates a religious display that appears only during holiday
seasons.145
The endorsement test promises to perpetuate the muddled and
confused doctrine that arose under the Lemon test. The analysis in
Crestwood demonstrates the difficulties in discerning the limits of
endorsement: the dissent argued that the presence of a multiplicity
of cultural activities negated the religious effect of a Catholic
mass; 4 6 and the majority wryly retorted that not even a herd of
reindeer would negate such a distinctly religious activity.' 47 Even
more unusual was the exchange between the majority 48 and dis-
sent' 49 over the importance of Roman Catholicism to an accurate
portrayal of Italian culture. Thus, in practice, the endorsement
turns on the same trivial distinctions that determined the outcome
under Lemon, and consequently, the endorsement test does not
142. "The law cares not about trifles." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 921 (6th ed.
1990).
143. Justice Kennedy has referred to Justice O'Connor's endorsement test as a "ju-
risprudence of minutiae." County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 674 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting).
144. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983). Chief Justice Burger wrote
for the Court in Marsh: "To invoke Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with
making the laws is not, in these circumstances, an 'establishment' of religion or a step
toward establishment; it is simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held
among the people of this country." Id
The question the Court would now ask is not whether opening a legislative session with
a prayer "establishes" a religion, but rather whether such a practice "endorses" religion
or more precisely would a reasonable person perceive such a practice to "endorse"
religion.
145. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
146. Doe v. Village of Crestwood, 917 F.2d 1476, 1485 (7th Cir. 1990) (Coffey, J.,
dissenting).
147. Id. at 1478-79 ("Even a herd of reindeer and a forest of jumbo candy canes
could not neuter a mass.").
148. Judge Easterbrook wrote for the court: "Although the seat of the Roman Cath-
olic Church is in Rome, Christianity is not distinctly Italian, and homage to Italian cul-
ture and food does not imply religious observance." Id. at 1479.
149. In dissent, Judge Coffey countered: "In view of the pervasive role of Roman
Catholicism in Italian culture, a presentation of Italian culture that is purely secular,
according to a reasonable person, would be considered most inaccurate and inappropri-
ate." Id. at 1483 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
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hold out much hope for those who desire a consistent body of law
under the Establishment Clause.
Furthermore, the endorsement test seems to distract the court's
attention from the primary inquiry under the Establishment
Clause, namely, an infringement on religious liberty."'5 Under the
endorsement test, as under Lemon, courts debate the theological
implications of religious symbols and sacred rituals and ultimately
decide what religious expression is proper. Yet such an inquiry
will never yield a consistent standard; rather, it will result in con-
tinued piecemeal litigation with all the inconsistencies that such an
approach entails. In seeking to arrive at an appropriate standard
to adjudicate Establishment Clause cases, perhaps a more coherent
approach would focus on the relation between the government's
act of endorsement and the alleged harm to the plaintiff's liberty
interest instead of the intense analysis of the content of the display.
The leading proponents of the endorsement test argue that en-
dorsement cuts to the very heart of the command of the Establish-
ment Clause. 151 Yet, history and practice say otherwise. Instances
of state endorsement of religion pervade many areas of civic life.
Certainly the phrase "In God We Trust" on the nation's currency
and the practice of taking oaths of office on a Bible endorse religion
in the common sense of the word.'52 These practices place the
prestige of the federal government behind distinctly and undenia-
bly religious practices.' 53 Consistency and justice under the en-
dorsement analysis would require the government to expunge these
favorable references to religion from the official vocabulary of the
state.' 54 Furthermore, while the exclusive focus on governmental
endorsement concededly eradicates any governmental favoritism of
150. See sources cited supra note 27.
151. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("As a theoretical matter, the endorsement test captures the essential com-
mand of the Establishment Clause .... ); see also Laycock, supra note 34, at 9-13 (dis-
cussing the endorsement test and the concept of government neutrality in First
Amendment jurisprudence).
152. The Oxford English Dictionary defines "endorse" as: "To confirm, sanction,
countenance, or vouch for (statements, opinion, acts, etc.; occasionally persons), as by an
endorsement." V OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 233 (2d ed. 1989).
153. In Allegheny, Justice Kennedy observed: "Either the endorsement test must in-
validate scores of traditional practices recognizing the place religion holds in our culture,
or it must be twisted and stretched to avoid inconsistency with practices we know to have
been permitted in the past." Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 674 (Kennedy, J., concurring and
dissenting).
154. Professor Laycock, a leading separationist, argues such traditional acknowledge-
ments of religion that pepper the history of the Republic violate the Establishment Clause
and its underlying principles: "The government should not put 'In God We Trust' on
coins; it should not open court sessions with 'God save the United States and this honora-
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religion, it fails to address any negative implications of the Estab-
lishment Clause. As history demonstrates, the threat to religious
liberty has come just as often from governmental disfavor and per-
secution of religion as from governmental endorsement of
religion. 155
V. PROPOSAL
When the state endorses or sponsors the religious activity of an
individual, the dynamic of the Establishment Clause analysis must
change. The paradigmatic case in which the court considers a
challenge to a state act shifts to one in which the court must also
consider the competing interests of the individual. The court can-
not hold the individual and the government to the same standard:
the government must comply with the Establishment Clause, while
conversely, the individual must be free from having to submit to
any such burden by virtue of the guarantees of free speech and free
exercise in the First Amendment. The court cannot excuse the
government from the command of the Establishment Clause.
Neither can the court deprive the individual of his fundamental
rights of free exercise and free speech. Courts, therefore, must
draw a line between the state's interest in not violating the Estab-
lishment Clause and the rights of the individual; and the line logi-
cally falls between the state's impermissible act of endorsement and
the individual's liberty interest. Under such analysis, then, courts
should identify the act of endorsement with enough specificity to
enable it to order that it cease, while leaving the individual's right
to free expression unharmed. Such an approach would ensure that
courts will not jettison an individual's religious liberty in a shotgun
approach to First Amendment jurisprudence.
On the broader question of what constitutional test to employ
when deciding an Establishment Clause issue, perhaps the stan-
dard proposed by Justice Kennedy holds the most promise for de-
livering the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence from its
ble Court'; and it should not name a city or a naval vessel for the Body of Christ or the
Queen of the Angels." Laycock, supra note 34, at 8.
155. Consider for example the plight of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints (the Mormons) in the late nineteenth century. NOONAN, supra note 18, at 194-
207. From the 1860s until the end of the century, Congress passed legislation to combat
the growth of the Mormon church. Id. at 200. While debating the Tucker Act, an act
declaring forfeit the property of the Mormon Church, one Congressman supporting the
Act stated: "The bill strikes at the very root of the church. It absolutely repeals the
charter which gave it existence." 18 CONG. REC. 592 (Jan. 12, 1887) (statement of Ezra
B. Taylor), reprinted in NOONAN, supra note 18, at 201.
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current muddled state.'56 Justice Kennedy, along with a promi-
nent commentator' and several respected Circuit Court of Ap-
peals judges,' advocates the adoption of a "proselytization" or
"coercion" test. The Framers intended the Bill of Rights to pro-
tect individual liberty, and they intended the First Amendment to
protect religious liberty by prohibiting the government from inter-
fering with religion, compelling observance of religion, or exacting
support for religion. Justice Kennedy has noted that absent coer-
cion, the risk of impairing religious liberty is minimal.' 59 Thus, a
violation of the Establishment Clause would turn on a showing of
coercion.
Although defining the appropriate limits of coercion may pres-
ent some difficulties, the coercion test holds promise for restoring
rationality to Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Under the coer-
cion analysis, the court would focus on the impact the challenged
practice has on the religious liberty of the plaintiff. If a govern-
mental act does not impair an individual's religious liberty, that act
should not run afoul of the Establishment Clause. While the coer-
cion standard may not be a panacea, it does promise to focus the
inquiry on the central concern of the Establishment Clause,
namely, the protection of religious liberty.
VI. CONCLUSION
A concern for religious liberty and the rights of the individual
demands that all of the rights guaranteed in the First Amendment
156. In his concurring opinion in Allegheny, Justice Kennedy offered his version of
the coercion test:
[I]t would be difficult indeed to establish a religion without some measure of
more or less subtle coercion, be it the form of taxation to supply the substantial
benefits that would sustain a state-established faith, direct compulsion to obser-
vance, or governmental exhortation to religiosity that amounts to in fact
proselytizing.
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659-60 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting).
157. Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 933, 938 (1986) ("It is difficult to see.., how an establishment could
exist in the absence of some form of coercion.").
158. In the Seventh Circuit, both Judges Coffey and Easterbrook have expressed
favorable views of the coercion standard. See Doe v. Small, 934 F.2d 743, 792 n. 1 (7th
Cir. 1991) (Coffey, J., dissenting) ("Without such coercion, I doubt that there can be
governmental establishment of religion."); Mather v. Village of Mundelein, 864 F.2d
1291, 1298, (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) ("[W]hen the government
speaks but does not compel others to worship or penalize those with different views, there
is no serious threat to religious liberty.").
159. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 662 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting) ("Absent
coercion, the risk of infringement of religious liberty by passive or symbolic accommoda-
tion is minimal.").
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be given full and equal consideration. The First Amendment con-
fers on religious speech the same protection that it confers on other
forms of speech. The Establishment Clause should promote reli-
gious liberty and thwart efforts by the government to interfere with
religion, not facilitate those efforts.
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